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INTRODUCTION
The catching of Herrings (Clupea harengus) has his-torically been as important to the UK as it has to Europe
as a whole, and the changes which have taken place in the
industry have had major social and economic conse-
quences for particular human communities. This paper
explores the development of the UK herring industry from
the 1960s to the late 1970s — a period characterized by
radical improvements in the technology of capture as well
as fundamental changes in fishing opportunities. As we
hope to demonstrate, the herring industry provides a unique
illustration of the economic and biological effects of
technological change in situations where access to the
natural resource remains virtually unrestricted. The paper
also draws attention to the problem faced by policymakers
in reconciling the aims of resource management with those
of industrial efficiency and modernization.
The UK herring industry attained a peak of output
immediately prior to World War I, when 577,000 tonnes
were landed at ports around the British Isles (Wood &
Hopper, 1984 p. 13). The expansion which led up to this
can be attributed to a favourable combination of circum-
stances which affected both supply and demand. On one
hand, the use of steam power in place of sail power in drift-
net vessels greatly increased the mobility and power of the
herring fleet; on the other, the buoyancy of international
markets helped to promote a profitable trade with a number
of European countries, such that by 1913 nearly 75% of the
Herrings caught in the UK were exported (ibid. p. 3).
The fortunes of the herring industry changed after
World War I, largely as a result of the loss of European
markets on which the herring trade was so reliant. The
problem was aggravated by the inability of catching capa-
city to adjust to the lower level of demand; a symptom of
this was that while UK herring catches fell by nearly 50%
between 1929 and 1933, the number of vessels in the
domestic fleet contracted by less than 10%. The overcapi-
talization and accompanying financial distress prompted a
Government enquiry into the state of the industry, which
led to the setting up of the Herring Industry Board (HIB) in
1935 (Sea-fish Commission for the United Kipgdom,
1934). The HIB saw its task as essentially a marketing one,
and put forward a series of ambitious plans to promote
Herring sales in the home and export markets, as well as
attempting to rationalize capacity. By 1938 the situation
had improved somewhat; both domestic consumption and
export demand were higher than they had been 5 years
previously, and much of the excess capacity had been
eliminated. However, while markets for Herring showed
some signs of having stabilized, the plight of the fishermen
involved appeared to have changed very little. The Elliot
Report of 1944 commented that, despite the attempts made
to reorganize the industry, 'the earnings of the herring
fishing fleet continued to be exceedingly low up to
outbreak of the War, and in many cases the fishermen did
not earn sufficient to meet the proportion of voyage
expenses.' (Scottish Home Department, 1944 p. 13).
After a period of prosperity following World War II,
the herring industry experienced recurrent problems which
the HIB did its best to ameliorate. These problems stem-
med from the variability of supplies, the often poor quality
of the raw material, and increased competition from other
foodstuffs. Attempts to widen the range of market outlets
met with some success, and the removal of surplus
Herrings for reduction to fishmeal and oil helped to cope
with the periodic gluts which had long been a feature of the
industry. Indeed, by the 1960s the difficulties created by
excess supply and low prices had come to be regarded as of
lesser importance compared with the failure to satisfy de-
mand during times of scarcity, and for this reason the HIB
formed the opinion that the fundamental problem of the
industry was one of undersupply (Herring Industry Board,
1962 p. 3, 1966 p. 21). The solution, as they saw it, was to
expand domestic production of Herring; this would not be
accomplished, however, 'unless fishing methods capable
of securing a larger catch per unit of effort are adopted'
(Herring Industry Board, 1966 p. 22).
Accordingly, the HIB saw its role as being to encourage
awareness and use by British herring fishermen of more
effective techniques of capture, and to remove all obstacles
to their successful adoption. The apparent success of this
policy, at least in its first few years, is illustrated in Fig. 1,
which indicates that landings by British vessels, which had
been on a downward trend throughout the 1950s and early
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FIG. 1. The UK herring industry: 'national' landings by British
vessels.
1960s, increased by almost two-thirds over the period
1968-73. This level of production could not be sustained,
however, and during the late 1970s landings fell sharply, so
that by 1979 the industry was producing a mere 3% of what
it had been in 1973.
The question which inevitably arises is whether the
collapse of the herring fisheries, that took place in the late
1970s, was a consequence of the rapid expansion which
preceded it. To investigate this we first of all examine the
details of the new technology which began to penetrate the
industry during the 1960s, and follow this examination
with an analysis of the natural resource and of the pattern of
harvesting.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AFTER 1960
In the early 1960s it was suggested that drift-netting, which
was the traditional method used by British fishermen to
capture Herring, had become outmoded and inefficient,
and that there was much to be gained from adopting more
modern fishing techniques which were being used with
success by foreign fleets (Herring Industry Board, 1962 p.
47). Drift-netting is essentially a passive method of fishing
whereby a series of nets are suspended in the water from
the vessel (Fig. 2) and in which the Herring become en-
trapped by the gills. Although for many years drift-netting
was regarded as the best all-round method available, its
relatively high labour requirements and low productivity
made it increasingly less attractive in an age when man-
power was becoming more difficult to obtain. The other
main method of fishing for Herring at that time, ring-
netting,* was largely restricted to use in sheltered waters or
close to shore, and for this reason it was not realistic to
expect substantially increased quantities of Herring to be
forthcoming from vessels employing this technique.
Clearly, the solution to the supposed 'undersupply' pro-
* An encircling method of netting, typically employing two
vessels. — Ed.
FIG. 2. A traditional herring vessel, originally built for drift-netting,
but now converted to using other methods. Photo: Ian Leask.
blem had to be found elsewhere.
In considering the alternatives to drift-netting, interest
initially centred on trawling. Trawling for Herring has been
practised in the UK for many years, but its effectiveness
was limited by the fact that the traditional technique of
'bottom' trawling could only be used to capture Herring
during those hours of the day when the shoals were close to
the sea-bed. It was recognized that if Herrings were to be
taken in reasonable quantities in mid-water, the gear would
have to be adapted. With financial support from the British
Government, the HIB in the early 1960s sponsored trials
aimed at investigating the feasibility of mid-water gear as
well as bottom trawls. Though the results of the trials were
mixed, enough interest was generated amongst fishermen
for a number of them to experiment with, and eventually
adopt, trawling on a commercial basis.
Trawling was not the only alternative to drift-netting,
however. Purse-seining,t a method in which a net is used to
encircle complete shoals of Herring, has been used with
success by Norwegian fishermen to exploit the Shetland
herring grounds; indeed, so visibly effective was this
method that in 1965 approaches were made to the HIB by
British fishermen for financial assistance to convert their
existing vessels for use as purse-seiners (Herring Industry
Board, 1966 p. 14). Though hesitant at first to give un-
qualified approval to the new technique, the Board in 1966
announced that it had given financial assistance to two
Scottish boats to undertake purse-seining; it also reported
that a number of boat-owners had already decided to go
ahead and build new vessels equipped for purse-seining,
and that others were 'actively considering the conversion
of existing drifters' (Fig. 3 and cf. Herring Industry Board,
1967 p. 13).
The diffusion of trawling proceeded very rapidly
throughout the late 1960s, such that between 1965 and
1970 the proportion of UK Herring taken by trawlers had
risen from 5% to 55%. (Fig. 4). The use of purse-seining
also became more widespread, though, partly because of its
later introduction, by 1970 it accounted for only 15% of
UK landings of Herring. By 1973, however, this proportion
had more than doubled to 37%. Drift-netting and ring-
t In answer to our query, the first-named Author replied that in
this method the 'power was greatly enhanced by the use of hydraulic
power-blocks for hauling the net and its contents from the water.' —
Ed.
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FIG. 3. A modern purse-seiner. Photo: Ian Leask.
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FIG. 4. Diffusion of innovations: method used by UK herring fisher-
men.
netting each underwent, respectively, an absolute and rela-
tive decline over the period, and by the mid-1970s these
traditional methods had all but disappeared {ibid.). Within
the space of a decade, therefore, the technological basis of
the industry had changed fundamentally in the UK and
elsewhere.
Several factors affected this transition. Experience of
using trawling and purse-seining soon established their
superiority over existing practices, and this was reinforced
by a powerful demonstration effect: the catching power of
the new techniques could be seen and attested to. Data
published by the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries
for Scotland (1979) allow us to draw comparisons between
the productivity of herring vessels exploiting the Scottish
west coast fishing-grounds over the period 1966-77 (Fig.
5). Trawling achieved higher catches per day than drift-
netting and ring-netting, while purse-seining stands out as
being markedly more efficient than any of the other
methods. Indeed, the catching power of an average purse-
seiner is almost six times that of a drift-netter. To some
DRIFT-NETTING RING-NETTING TRAWLING PURSE-
FIG. 5. Productivity of herring fishing methods: average catch-rated,
1966-77.
extent this latter result can be explained in terms of vessel
size; it has been estimated, for example, that compared with
a drift-netter, the average gross tonnage of a purse-seiner
was about two-and-a-half times as great and its crew re-
quirement roughly double (Cunningham et al., 1985 p. 60).
Quite clearly, however, even when these size factors are
taken into account, a substantial productivity differential
remains between purse-seining and drift-netting. Such
differences in physical performance were made all the
more conspicuous by the geographical mobility of the
vessels and their crews, which resulted in a high degree of
interaction between innovators and non-innovators. In
these circumstances it was difficult to conceal what to
many observers were the half-evident advantages of the
new techniques.
The HIB facilitated the innovation process in a number
of ways, the most direct of which was through financial
assistance for vessel construction and improvement.
During the ten years from 1965 to 1975, 144 applications
for assistance towards the cost of building new boats were
received by the Board, and 118 offers of assistance were
made. This involved a total of £5.9 m in grants and £5.7 m
in loans, the bulk of which went towards the construction of
vessels designed for trawling, purse-seining, or operation
as multipurpose craft. In parallel with this the Board
awarded a large number of grants and loans for the
modernization and upgrading of vessels with new gear and
equipment, all of which contributed to the catching power
of the herring fleet.
Possibly of greater significance than even the direct
assistance given to capital investment were the active steps
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taken by the HIB to engender a favourable climate of
opinion towards new technology, and in particular the
efforts made to dismiss suggestions that the new fishing
methods were destructive of the natural resource. The 1967
Annual Report of the HIB, after referring with satisfaction
to the growing use of trawling and purse-seining, also made
mention of the concern expressed by Clyde fishermen that
trawling was potentially damaging to the Herring and its
spawn. While conceding that there might be a threat from
the unrestricted use of trawling in that particular fishery,
the Board insisted that in 'almost all other areas with which
the Scottish industry is concerned, the spawning stocks are
distributed much more widely and there is not the same
potential danger to the stock as a whole which occurs on the
Clyde' (Herring Industry Board, 1968 p. 11).
The latter contention begs the question of whether the
HIB fully appreciated the real significance of the changes
which they were helping to bring about by making the
capture of Herring more profitable, whereupon fishing
activity would intensify and increased pressure would be
imposed on the existing stocks. The extent to which this
intensification took place, and the consequences which it
had for the fisheries, are examined in the next section.
EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Theoretical Consequences
In most bioeconomic models of fish populations
exploited under open-access conditions, it is conven-
tionally assumed that labour and capital will enter a fishery
if any profit is expected to be earned, and will likewise exit
from the fishery if losses are anticipated (Clark, 1976;
Cunningham & Whitmarsh, 1981). The adoption of a new
and more efficient method of harvesting (or any other
technical improvement which lowers the unit costs of
production) can be expected to result in a short-run im-
provement in profitability for those fishermen who avail
themselves of the opportunity. By assumption, however,
this very success would serve to encourage others to
innovate and enter the fishery in pursuit of the mirage of
profit, and this process will be given added impetus as
established fishermen, using traditional fishing methods,
may find it worth while to switch from the old technology
to the new (Whitmarsh, 1990).
With such switching, the fish-stocks will become more
and more heavily depleted as a result of intensified fishing,
and this will be reflected in a decline in catch-rates for all
participating vessels. Stock depletion thus imposes an
external cost on fishermen. So long as the innovation
process continues, and while there is any profit still to be
gained, the biological exploitation of the fishery will
become more intensified and result in a progressive
deterioration of the natural resource. Sustainable yield can
be expected to increase throughout the early stages of the
development of the fishery — until a finite maximum is
reached (the maximum sustainable yield); but it will sub-
sequently fall below this level as stock depletion becomes
severe.
The scenario we have just described may be modified
by a number of other influences, including changes in the
fish population which are unconnected with the effects of
fishing. In reality, the biomass of the adult fish-stock will
fluctuate from year to year, due to variations in the relative
abundance of juvenile fish recruited to the fishery. A series
of good year-classes, for example, may well conceal (and
indeed offset) the stock-depleting effects of intensified
fishing.
A further complication, which is especially likely to
apply to shoaling pelagic fish such as Herring, is that, as the
population is reduced, the geographical area over which the
fish are distributed is likely to decrease. Additionally, the
shoaling behaviour of the species may be such that, as the
stock size decreases, the fish form fewer schools but of an
average size similar to that which previously obtained
(Csirke, 1988). Both these effects may make the fish more
vulnerable to capture by certain methods of fishing, with
the result that the decline in the fish population may not be
fully reflected in the decline in individual vessels' catch-
rates. Indeed, for some types of vessel, catch-rates may
hold up quite well in the face of stock depletion, leading to
the very real risk that the population may be fished to near
extinction.
Empirical Evidence on Productivity and Stock Abundance
Herrings are distributed over an extended area of the
Continental Shelf in the Northeast Atlantic, and from
earliest times fleets from several European countries have
participated in their exploitation. The two most important
concentrations of Herrings are those situated off the
Northwest coast of Norway, known as the Atlanto-
Scandian stock, and those located in the North Sea and to
the West of Britain (Coull, 1988). Within each group there
is a characteristic pattern of spawning and migration,
which in the past has had an important bearing on the way
fishing operations have been conducted. The wide area of
distribution and the migratory nature of the Herring have
also had implications for the assessment and regulation of
the fisheries, as catches in a particular area may consist of
Herrings from more than one stock. In particular, this
complicates the task of deciding what would be the most
appropriate level of fishing effort in a given region of
capture, because for management purposes catches need to
be matched to the stock from which they are harvested.
Fisheries management is made more complicated still by
the existence of sub-stocks, such as those which are now
believed to exist in the North Sea.
As might be expected, the more remotely situated
Atlanto-Scandian stock of Herring has been a less im-
portant source of supply to the UK than those found in
closer proximity to the British Isles, notably off the West of
Scotland (Table I). The West of Scotland fishery is of
particular significance in the present context, not only
because it was to become the major supplier of Herrings to
the UK but also because, for much of the period of the
1960s and 1970s, the UK accounted for the bulk of inter-
national landings from this region. Indeed, Table II shows
clearly that UK involvement with the herring fisheries to
the West of the country was far higher than it was
elsewhere. The condition of the western stocks is therefore
likely to have been affected by the activities of UK vessels
to a much greater degree than the other herring stocks in the
Northeast Atlantic.
Table III analyses the changes which took place in the
West of Scotland herring fishery from 1967 to 1977, the
period which saw the sharpest rise and fall in fishing
activity. The fishery expanded very rapidly in the late
1960s, to reach a peak of landings in 1973; but this was
more than matched by the fall in landings which took place
in the years that followed. The UK was the leading
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TABLE I
The UK Herring Industry: Regions of Capture.
NOMINAL CATCHES (TONNES)
NORTH SEA
England & Wales
Scotland
N. Ireland
Total UK
WEST of SCOTLAND
England & Wales
Scotland
N. Ireland
Total UK
IRISH SEA
England & Wales
Scotland
N. Ireland
Total UK
OTHER REGIONS
England & Wales
Scotland
N. Ireland
Total UK
Total all Regions
1960
16,265
29,911
0
46,176
36
58,921
0
58,957
412
696
4,668
5,776
162
7
0
169
111,078
1965
11,441
28,109
0
39,550
28
53,909
0
53,937
2,681
671
1,702
5,054
1,149
4
0
1,153
99,694
1970
9,528
22,768
0
32,296
0
103,530
1
103,531
4,631
416
4,353
9,400
394
0
0
394
145,621
1975
6,344
8,741
0
15,085
125
89,298
6
89,429
1,825
441
5,612
7,879
247
25
0
272
112,665
1980
48
38
0
86
33
2,084
0
2,117
737
14
2,450
3,201
61
101
0
162
5,566
Sources: ICES (1962) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 45, Copenhagen, Denmark: 61 pp., illustr.
ICES (1967) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 50, Copenhagen, Denmark: 74 pp., illustr.
ICES (1972) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 60, Copenhagen, Denmark: 175 pp., illustr.
ICES (1982) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 65, Copenhagen, Denmark: 103 pp., illustr.
TABLE II
UK Participation in European Herring Grounds.
NOMINAL CATCHES (TONNES)
NORTH SEA
UK
Other nations
Total
%UK
WEST OF SCOTLAND
North Sea
UK
Other nations
Total
%UK
IRISH SEA
UK
Other nations
Total
%UK
OTHER REGIONS
UK
Other nations
Total
%UK
ALL REGIONS
UK
Other nations
Total
%UK
1960
46,176
740,774
786,950
5.9
58,957
9,273
68,230
86.4
5,776
16,059
21,835
26.5
169
1,519,474
1,519,643
0.01
111,078
2,285,580
2,396,658
4.6
1965
39,550
1,190,765
1,230,315
3.2
53,937
12,446
66,383
81.3
5,054
5.025
10,079
50.1
1,153
2,267,707
2,268,860
0.05
99,694
3,475,943
3,575,637
2.8
1970
32,296
716,454
748,750
4.3
103,531
53,506
157,037
65.9
9,400
5,884
15,284
61.5
394
499,028
499,422
0.08
145,621
1,274,872
1,420,493
10.3
1975
15,085
280,222
295,307
5.1
89,429
52,967
142,396
62.8
7,879
25,147
33,026
23.9
272
605,564
605,836
0.04
112,665
963,900
1,076,565
10.5
1980
86
12,161
12,247
0.7
2,117
8,957
11,074
19.1
3,201
12,046
15,247
21
162
636,668
636,830
0.03
5,566
669,832
675,398
0.8
Sources: ICES (1962) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 45, Copenhagen, Denmark: 61 pp., illustr.
ICES (1967) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 50, Copenhagen, Denmark: 74 pp., illustr.
ICES (1972) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 60, Copenhagen, Denmark: 175 pp., illustr.
ICES (1982) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 65, Copenhagen, Denmark: 103 pp., illustr.
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TABLE III
West of Scotland Herring Fishery, 1967-77.
Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
International
Catches
(tonnes)
102,694
100,323
123,593
157,037
226,310
197,181
244,771
203,741
142,396
111,800
54,538
UK
Catches
(tonnes)
67,404
65,187
90,225
103,531
104,922
112,203
127,638
111,547
89,429
57,590
30,371
Fishing
Mortality
Rate
0.22
0.20
0.30
0.35
0.66
0.45
0.63
0.82
0.89
1.11
0.8
Fish-stock
biomass
(tonnes)
451,000
450,000
510,000
513,000
489,000
667,000
603,000
377,000
225,000
172,000
82,000
Sources:
ICES (1969) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 52,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 76 pp., illustr.
ICES (1970) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 53,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 77 pp., illustr.
ICES (1971) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 54,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 77 pp., illustr.
ICES (1972) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 55,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 78 pp., illustr.
ICES (1973) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 56,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 77 pp., illustr.
ICES (1974) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 57,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 85 pp., illustr.
ICES (1976) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 58,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 163 pp., illustr.
ICES (1977) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 59,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 159 pp., illustr.
ICES (1978) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 60,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 175 pp., illustr.
ICES (1979) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 61,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 303 pp., illustr.
ICES (1980) Bulletin Statistique des Peches Maritimes, Vol. 62,
Copenhagen, Denmark: 329 pp., illustr.
SAVILLE, A. & BAILEY, R. (1980). The assessment and management of
the Herring Stocks in the North Sea and to the West of Scotland.
Rapp. P.-v. Reun. Cons. Int. Explor. Mer, 177, Tables 2 and 3, p.
131.
Notes: Saville & Bailey also present alternative estimates of fishing
mortality up to 1975 which allow for emigration effects. The revised
figures suggest that, for much of this period, the fishing mortality rate
may have been greater than the data presented above would suggest.
participant in the herring fishery throughout the period,
taking on average some 60% of total landings. Scientific
evidence to support the suggestion that the development of
the fishery had a significant impact on the natural resource
is revealed by the data on the fishing mortality rate and the
biomass of the fish-stock. Fishing mortality showed a
marked tendency to increase after 1968, which in itself
would have contributed to the depletion of the fish-stock.
The fact that stock depletion did not become clearly
apparent until after 1972 can be explained by a succession
of good year-classes in the preceding years, which caused
the estimated fish-stock biomass to rise to a peak of
667,000 tonnes. Recruitment of juvenile fish to the adult
stock was generally much weaker after 1973, however,
which in combination with the increasing pressure of
fishing undoubtedly led to the dramatic fall in the fish-
stock biomass that eventually took place (Saville & Bailey,
1980).
The externalities of this collapse are highlighted in the
data on UK vessel catch-rates, which fell very sharply after
1973 (Table IV). The figures confirm the fact that pelagic
trawlers and purse-seiners generally achieved higher catch-
rates than drift-netters and ring-netters, but also show that
none of these vessel types was immune from the effects of
stock depletion. For drift-netters the decline in productivity
took place fairly steadily over a number of years, whereas
for the other types of vessel the decline took place in a
much shorter period of time and with correspondingly
greater severity. By 1977, trawlers were averaging 2.6
tonnes per day at sea — a mere 30% of what they had been
catching 10 years previously, and indeed significantly
below the average physical performance achieved by drift-
netters and ring-netters in the 1960s.
The reason why the herring stocks were not prevented
from falling to such low levels was due to the fact that,
TABLE IV
Catch-rates of British Herring Vessels on Scottish West Coast,
1967-77.
CATCH PER DAY AT SEA (tonnes)
Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Drift-
netters
5.07
4.21
4.19
3.85
4.44
3.09
1.54
1.58
1.58
1.17
1.33
Ring-
netters
3.73
4.62
5.12
4.89
4.80
6.19
5.65
5.70
5.84
4.96
1.17
Pelagic
Trawlers
8.63
6.34
7.34
6.44
7.17
8.38
6.98
6.01
4.84
4.24
2.60
Purse-
seiners
12.40
8.69
14.77
16.41
21.58
22.70
36.16
24.70
19.85
13.22
6.70
Sources:
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1969),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1968, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 53 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1970),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1969, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 53 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1971),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1970, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 53 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1972),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1971, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 48 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1973),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1972, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 48 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1974),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1973, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 48 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1975),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1974, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 47 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1976),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1975, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 54 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1977),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1976, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 56 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES FOR SCOTLAND (1978),
Scottish Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables 1977, HMSO, Edin-
burgh, UK: 59 pp.
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throughout the 1960s and 1970s, control over the inter-
national fishing effort on the principal European fishing-
grounds was almost non-existent. A system of Total
Allowable Catches was introduced in 1974 by the North-
east Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), but because
the national quotas which were eventually agreed by
NEAFC member countries were set too high, the effect was
probably to intensify the pressure of fishing rather than to
reduce it (Saville & Bailey, 1980 p. 133). Not until 1977,
the year in which responsibility for fisheries management
within the newly-created 200 (nautical) miles (370.4 km)
Exclusive Economic Zone passed to the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), was a ban on excessive fishing
of Herring eventually agreed to. This was imposed first on
herring fishing in the North Sea, followed one year later by
a similar ban on the West of Scotland fishery (Wood &
Hopper, 1984). Up until the late 1970s, therefore, the
herring fisheries retained their essentially open-access
character, and it is hardly surprising that in this situation the
intensification of fishing activity brought about by ad-
vances in technology should have had an adversely visible
effect on both the natural resource and its industrial
productivity.
Economic Implications
The failure to control the expansion of fishing effort
also meant that any resource-rent (see below) which the
herring fisheries might have generated would be dissi-
pated. In this context resource-rent can be defined as the
difference between the value of output and the opportunity
cost of the labour and capital inputs (i.e. fishermen, vessels,
plant, and equipment) devoted to or resulting from the
activity of harvesting. As such it represents the net eco-
nomic benefit which society could obtain from the
fisheries. If the fish-stocks had been subject to property
rights, this rent would have been collected by the resource
owner, who in theory at least would have an incentive to
regulate the amount of fishing so as to generate the maxi-
mum economic return on his natural asset. In practice,
however, property-rights in the European herring fisheries
— as with many other marine fisheries — do not exist, and
hence the all-important imperative to control fishing effort
is absent*. What happens, in effect, is that fishermen and
others involved mistake resource-rent for profit, and as
profits are competed away in the 'race for fish', so such
'rent' is inevitably dissipated.
The effect of introducing improved harvesting techno-
logy into a fishery is to increase its potential economic
value by making it possible to produce output though using
fewer input factors. This potential will only be realized,
however, if the fishery can be managed in such a way as to
capture the resource-rent. Where this is not the case, and
the rent is allowed to dissipate, society effectively loses out
on an important source of economic surplus. Rent dis-
sipation thus implies a misallocation of resources, and this
is reflected in the tendency for open-access fisheries to
attract excessive units of labour and capital.
For the West of Scotland herring fishery no studies
have hitherto been undertaken to measure its potential
economic value, and the results presented here represent a
first attempt to provide this information. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to explain the full details of the
* As in the case of such 'commons' as the High Seas -
Editorial opening our preceding issue. — Ed.
- see The
methodology which underlies the results, but the essence of
our approach has been to calculate the maximum sus-
tainable resource-rent which could have been obtained
from the fishery employing the 'best-practice' methods of
fishing which were in use in the late 1970s. This was done
by first of all estimating the functional relationship
between sustainable yield and fishing effort, monetizing
this function by the unit value of Herring, and then de-
ducting from it the cost of fishing effort. Using the costs
and prices which obtained in 1976 (the year preceding the
collapse of the fishery), the highest level of resource-rent
which could have been generated on a sustainable basis is
estimated to be £14 millions per annum. As no resource-
rent was ever actually obtained from the fishery, this figure
therefore represents the stream of benefit lost to society
owing to the failure to implement effective fisheries ma-
nagement.
Comparisons With Other Fisheries
The events described above are not unique, and other
fisheries where technological change in harvesting has
occurred tell a similar story. It has been observed elsewhere
(Cunningham etal., 1985 p. 66) that, although many of the
advances in fish-catching technology have often helped to
bring about substantial improvements in catch-rates and
profitability for individual operators, the aggregate effects
have often proved contradictory. While there is no denying
that technical progress may contribute to the growth and
development of a fishery, it is also true that this same
'progress' may hasten its overexploitation and ultimate
collapse. The Peruvian Anchoveta (Engraulis ringens) is a
particularly spectacular example of where in the early
1970s landings suffered a sharp fall after a period of rapid
expansion, and even though it is well known that oceanic
factors were implicated in the collapse, it seems highly
likely that the seeds of destruction had already been sown
as a result of the build-up of excessive numbers of vessels
(notably purse-seiners) of very great catching-power.
A further illustration of where fleet modernization
appears to have had adverse effects is in Thailand, where
the introduction of trawl technology has led to over-
capitalization, depletion of the demersal stocks, and en-
croachment of distant-water trawlers onto coastal fishing
grounds. In both these examples, as in the case of Herring,
it may be contended that the problem was not technological
change as such but the failure of public authorities to see at
an early stage that the change needed to be brought within
the remit of fisheries management.
What is distinctive about the case of Herring, however,
is that it illustrates with sharp clarity how a fishery can
finance its own demise. We have already established that
the adoption of new catching methods increased the
potential of the herring fishery to generate a resource-rent,
but that the absence of a resource owner meant that this rent
was never extracted. Instead, it was effectively used by the
fishermen to pay for the expansion and upgrading of the
fleet. The speed at which technological change took place
in the herring fishery testifies to the fact that the resource-
rent was, as we tried to demonstrate, of a 'non-trivial'
amount. In a very real sense, therefore, the resource-rent
provided a fund of money — additional to any funds com-
ing from public authorities — which unwittingly came to
be used to finance the overcapitalization of the fleet and the
biological and economic consequences which followed.
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CONCLUSION
Advances in new fishing technology present policymakers
with both an opportunity and a challenge. On the positive
side, the opportunity exists to harvest fish-stocks using
cost-effective methods which permit a genuine saving of
labour and capital inputs. The economic benefits of so
doing could, in principle, be captured in the form of in-
creased resource-rent. The challenge, however, is to find
some way of preventing the resource-rent from being
dissipated as fishermen enter the fishery in pursuit of profit.
Failure to control the expansion of effort not only leads to
the dissipation of rent but also results in the depletion of the
fish-stocks to a point where in some cases biological
recovery is severely impaired.
On the basis of the evidence presented in this paper it
might well be concluded that, in the case of the herring
fisheries, the UK authorities saw only the opportunities
which technological change offered, and failed to appre-
ciate the challenge which it posed for fisheries manage-
ment. We might be tempted to go further and argue that the
steps taken by the Herring Industry Board to promote the
adoption of new fishing techniques were misguided, given
the economic and biological over-fishing which eventually
resulted. The latter conclusion would be unjustified,
however, as the HIB had little choice but to pursue the
policy it did. We must appreciate that prior to 1977,
national governments had no real incentive to impose
control measures on their domestic fleets, as to do so would
have meant foregoing part of their share of the common
property resource. In this situation it is hardly surprising
that the emphasis of UK fisheries policy, as represented by
the activities of the HIB, was placed upon fleet modern-
ization and technological advance.
Accordingly the UK, in common with other national
participants, was caught in a 'Prisoner's Dilemma': curbs
on their own fishermen ran the risk that other nations might
not exercise similar restraint and so be of no avail, while a
strategy of unrestricted fishing ran the risk that the same
tactic would be followed by competitors and result in
overexploitation of the resource. Though the HIB was
aware of the dilemma, it nevertheless came down in favour
of a policy of 'taking all we can while the going's good'
(Herring Industry Board, 1962 p. 4). This was further jus-
tified on the grounds that, even if such action did threaten a
resource crisis, it would at least concentrate the minds of
those who had responsibility for fisheries management and
hasten the introduction of conservation measures. As
events were to show, however, the Board's confidence in
the ability of the authorities to manage the herring fisheries
turned out to be sadly misplaced. It is ironic indeed that UK
herring fishermen, whom the HIB did not wish to see
disadvantaged in the race to obtain fish, faced the ultimate
disadvantage of a resource crisis which forced many of
them to look elsewhere for their livelihood.
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SUMMARY
Technological change in the UK herring industry took
place rapidly after 1965, due in part to the active en-
couragement given to fishermen to switch from drift-
netting to pelagic trawling and purse-seining. The adoption
and diffusion of these modern methods of capture sti-
mulated a major expansion of output, but this very success
was undermined by the depletion of the fish-stocks on
which the industry depended. In the case of the West of
Scotland herring fisheries, which were especially im-
portant to UK fishermen, the decline in fish-stock biomass
caused vessel catch-rates to fall after 1973. The failure of
international fisheries management, which acted as a per-
missive factor in the intensification of fishing effort, also
had important economic implications as it resulted in the
dissipation of resource-rent. The Authors calculate that the
maximum sustainable 'rent' which could have been gene-
rated from the West of Scotland herring fishery was appro-
ximately £14 millions per annum at 1976-equivalent prices.
The resource-rent effectively financed the overcapi-
talization of the fleet and the decline which followed, and it
is the speed with which this occurred that most dis-
tinguishes the herring fishery from others where techno-
logical change has taken place. The article concludes by
arguing that, although the UK public authorities (notably
the Herring Industry Board) might reasonably be criticized
for pursuing a development strategy which resulted in eco-
nomic and biological over-fishing, the international regime
of fisheries management which prevailed at the time gave
them little choice but to adopt a pro-active approach to
technical innovation.
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